

# Body Spaces

Invisible Architecture 1.0

## Introduction

The seven artefacts that compose Object 1.0 of Invisible Architecture are linked through the relationship between our bodies and space. Not necessarily as literal as you may think, but through how we understand ourselves, how others understand us and the types of social practices that have forced the interpretation of our bodies to transform.

From Eco's concern about fitting in to his jeans, through Victoria Vesna's VRML installation, to Maria Pini's essay about rave culture, each artifact hopes to conjure alternative readings of the relationship of our bodies with space.

Whilst many pieces are written and become self explanatory, the inclusion of Dono's installation 'Glass Vehicles' and Fleure's 'Human Regions' operate as objects to reflect upon in a different but complementary manner.

Please enjoy the selection of texts, images and models, they are meant for reading in unusual places; on the bus, whilst watching The Bill and at any point when an opportunity for extending the possibility of a situation arises.

Chris Speed

## Lumbar Thought

Umberto Eco

### Taken from *Faith in Fakes, Minerva, 1986.*

A few weeks ago, Luca Goldoni wrote an amusing report from the Adriatic coast about the mishaps of those who wear blue jeans for reasons of fashion, and no longer know how to sit down or arrange the external reproductive apparatus. I believe the problem broached by Goldoni is rich in philosophical reflections, which I would like to pursue on my own and with the maximum seriousness, because no everyday experience is too base for the thinking man, and it is time to make philosophy proceed, not only on its own two feet, but also with its own loins.

I began wearing blue jeans in the days when very few people did, but always on vacation. I found—and still find—they very comfortable, especially when I travel, because there are no problems of creases, tearing, spots. Today they are worn also for looks, but primarily they are very utilitarian. It's only in the past few years that I've had to renounce this pleasure because I've put on weight. True, if you search thoroughly you can find an extra large (Macy's could fit even Oliver Hardy with blue jeans), but they are large not only around the waist, but also around the legs, and they are not a pretty sight.

Recently, cutting down on drink, I shed the number of pounds necessary for me to try again some almost normal jeans. I under-went the calvary described by Luca Goldoni, as the saleswoman said, "Pull it tight, it'll stretch a bit"; and I emerged, not having to suck in my belly (I refuse to accept such compromises). And so, after a long tiiiie, I was enjoying the sensation of wearing pants that, instead of clutching the waist, held the hips, because it is a characteristic of jeans to grip the lumbar-sacral region and stay up thanks not to suspension but to adherence.

After such a long rime, the sensadon was new. The jeans didn't pinch, but they made their presence felt. Elastic though they were, I sensed a kind of sheath around the lower half of my body. Even if I had wished, I couldn't mm or wiggle my belly inside my pants; if anything, I had to turn it or wiggle it together with my pants. Which subdivides so to speak one's body into two independent zones, one free of doming aooove the belt, and the Other organically identified with the clothing, from immediately below the belt to the anktebones. I discovered that my movements, my way of walking, turning, sitting, hurrying, were different. Not more difficult, or less difficult, but certainly different.

As a result, I lived in the knowledge that I had jeans on, whereas normally we live forgetting that we're wearing undershorts or trousers. I lived for my jeans, and as a result I assumed the exterior behavior of one who wears jeans. In any case, I assumed a demeanor. It's strange that the traditionally most informal and anti-etiquete garment should be the one that so strongly imposes an etiquette. As a rule I am boisterous, I sprawl in a chair, I slump wherever I please, with no daim to elegance: my blue jeans checked these actions, made me more polite and mature. I discussed it at length, especially with consultants .of the opposite sex, from whom I learned what, for that matter, I had already suspected: that for women experiences of this kind are familiar because all their garments are conceived to impose a demeanor—high heels, girdles, brassieres, pantyhose, tight sweaters.

I thought then about how much, in the history of civilization, dress as armor has influenced behavior and, in consequence, exterior morality. The Victorian bourgeois was stiff and formal because of stiff collars; the nineteenth-century gentleman was constrained by his tight redingotes, boots, and top hats that didn't allow brusque movements of the head. If Vienna had been on the equator and its bourgeoisie had gone around in Bermuda shorts, would Freud have described the same neurotic symptoms, the same Oedipal triangles? And would he have described them in the same way if he, the doctor, had been a Scot, in a kilt (under which, as everyone knows, the rule is to wear nothing)?

A garment that squeezes the testicles makes a man think differently. Women during menstruation; people suffering from orchitis, victims of hemorrhoids, urethritis, prostate and similar ailments know to what extent pressures or obstacles in the sacro-iliac area influence one's mood and mental agility. But the same can be said (perhaps to a lesser degree) of the neck, the back, the head, the feet, A human race that has learned to move about in shoes has oriented its thought differently from the way it would have done if the race had gone barefoot. It is sad, especially for philosophers in the idealistic tradition, to think that the Spirit originates from these conditions; yet not only is this true, but the great thing is that Hegel knew it also, and therefore studied the cranial bumps indicated by phrenologists, and in a book actually entitled *Phenomenology of Mind*. But the problem of my jeans led me to other observations. Not only did the garment impose a demeanor on me; by focusing my attention on demeanor, it obliged me to live towards the exterior world. It reduced, in other words, the exercise of my

interior-ness. For people in my profession it is normal to walk along with your mind on other things: the article you have to write, the lecture you must give, the relationship between the One and the Many, the Andreotti government, how to deal with the problem of the Redemption, whether there is life on Mars, the latest song of Celentano, the paradox of Epimenides. In our line this is called "the interior life." Well, with my new jeans my life was entirely exterior: I thought about the relationship between me and my pants, and the relationship between my pants and me and the society we lived in. I had achieved heteroconsciousness, that is to say, an epidermic self-awareness.

I realized then that thinkers, over the centuries, have fought to free themselves of armor. Warriors lived an exterior life, all enclosed in cuirasses and tunics; but monks had invented a habit that, while fulfilling, on its own, the requirements of demeanor (majestic, flowing, all of a piece, so that it fell in statuesque folds), it left the body (inside, underneath) completely free and unaware of itself. Monks were rich in interior life and very dirty, because the body, protected by a habit that, ennobling it, released it, was free to think, and to forget about itself. The idea was not only ecclesiastic; you have to think only of the beautiful mantles Erasmus wore. And when even the intellectual must dress in lay armor (wigs, waistcoats, knee breeches) we see that when he retires to think, he swaggers in rich dressing-gowns, or in Balzac's loose, drolatique blouses. Thought abhors tights.

But if armor obliges its wearer to live the exterior life, then the age-old female spell is due also to the fact that society has imposed armors on women, forcing them to neglect the exercise of thought. Woman has been enslaved by fashion not only because, in obliging her to be attractive, to maintain an ethereal demeanor, to be pretty and stimulating, it made her a sex object; she has been enslaved chiefly because the clothing counseled for her forced her psychologically to live for the exterior. And this makes us realize how intellectually gifted and heroic a girl had to be before she could become, in those clothes, Madame de Sevigne, Victoria Colonna, Madame Curie, or Rosa Luxemburg. The reflection has some value because it leads us to discover that, apparent symbol of liberation and equality with men, the blue jeans that fashion today imposes on women are a trap of Domination; for they don't free the body, but subject it to another label and imprison it in other armors that don't seem to be armors because they apparently are not "feminine."

A final reflection—in imposing an exterior demeanor, clothes are semiotic devices, machines for communicating. This was known, but there had been no attempt to illustrate the parallel with the syntactic structures of language, which, in the opinion of many people, influence our view of the world. The syntactic structures of fashions also influence our view of the world, and in a far more physical way than the consecutio temporum or the existence of the subjunctive. You see how many mysterious paths the dialectic between oppression and liberation must follow, and the struggle to bring light. Even via the groin.

1976

## Janet Cardiff: The Missing Voice

(Case Study B): An Audio Walk

By Monica Biagioli


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<http://www.artfocus.com/JanetCardiff.html>



Janet Cardiff's *The Missing Voice (Case Study B)* is part walking tour, part historical account, and part stream-of-consciousness narration leading you on a disorienting journey through the inner cityscape of East London. The walk lasts some 45 minutes, starting at the Whitechapel Library, where upon receiving headphones and a disc player, you follow the instructions from the narrator on the disc. The voice-over guides you to the crime section of the library, asks you to read excerpts from books, and leads you out of the library and onto the street. There, you follow instructions that take you through narrow alleyways into Brick Lane, past the old Jewish quarter into Spitalfields, and after pausing at the garden steps of a church, drops you off at the Liverpool Street tube station, where the piece ends; leaving you to puzzle your way back to the library, where the piece started.

It is difficult to know whether the listener assumes the role of participant in this work, because you are never quite in control of where you are going and are, therefore, not necessarily participating. Instead, it feels more like Cardiff has stage-managed all of reality and the world itself has become a huge theatrical production, filled with ambient sounds and a loose narrative about a woman wishing to "get lost". Cardiff herself admits she hasn't quite figured out the precise role of the participant. Instead, she is more interested in exploring how we interact with the city and what types of thought processes take place during that function. Thus, internal dialogues--much like those we carry on inside as we walk the city--become disembodied thought patterns that stream throughout the soundtrack. Sounds taken for granted as you cross the street or as you walk past a shop become disjointed from seen reality. In this way, a car horn beeping that plays on the CD forces you to watch out for approaching traffic that never materialises as you cross the street. On the other hand, some sounds become disturbing because they do correlate with the outside world, such as a band heard playing on a street corner. The band is really there and is playing the same tune as the one heard on the headphones, which is quite prescient and disturbing. The overall sensation is surreal, schizophrenic even.



Besides having ambient qualities, sound has a physical component as well, which allows for the stretching and pulling of time. Compressing and expanding time--playing with its linear possibilities--is something achievable with audio, and Cardiff uses it to great effect to draw us into her surreal world. By providing an audio track separate from the video track (what is seen), the result is that you are never quite sure whether what you hear is coming from the headphones or whether it is outside noise. With such disjunction between video and audio in some cases and correlation in others, there is a bleed-over effect: what is heard influences what is seen and vice versa. In the end, you are not quite sure how to orient yourself and become almost entirely dependent on the recording to lead the way. The listener, thus, temporarily hands over control to Cardiff by putting on headphones and is lulled into the rhythm she establishes. The effect is hypnotic and recalls the filtered reality generally experienced through mass media.

To achieve such a realistic sense of ambient sound, Cardiff walked around with two audio sets set up on a dummyhead to capture sounds in situ while she walked. Like a trickster, she makes you believe that something is really there, whether it is or not, and thus expands the dichotomy of what is perceived by the brain and what is palpable through the senses. This idea is carried through in the piece itself, because as Cardiff generates a sensed reality through sound, she concurrently carries through a narrative in the first person voice--one heard in a disjointed way--that describes the internal dialogues that are carried around as one walks down the street. These running conversations are made up, as Cardiff puts it, of "what is the present, memories of childhood, replaying an argument you had with someone the week before".

The piece creates an intimate experience even though it alienates you from the world, like the Walkman did in the 80s and the Internet does today. It also effectively replicates the way society records reality to verify its own existence and conveys one of the pleasures of living in a big city: the ability to remain anonymous. Still, there is connection (through involvement with the tape) and disconnection (when the tape stops); so in this way, *The Missing Voice* (Case Study B) comments on our need for relationships that become increasingly difficult to maintain because of moving or travel. We become disconnected from our relationships and yearn to make contact. And so this piece, slightly intimate but removed, provides a sense of connection that goes beyond a sense of time and focuses attention on the immediate experience.

In a schizophrenic way, Cardiff draws you into a heard experience, locks you into an erotic bond, and at the end of the trip, you are snapped back to reality. This effect is worked out at the editing and sound mixing stage (Cardiff worked with George Bures Miller as collaborator on this piece). The work consists of four layered tracks. The first track is recorded right on the street, with a narrator giving directions. This track is interspersed with other tracks, so that if you are concentrating on following directions, you can not follow the sentences in full, and in this way an open-ended narrative is created, where specific phrases stick in the listener's mind. The second voice is recorded at the studio and functions as the thinking voice of the piece (as Cardiff notes, "I recorded it as if I was thinking. I made it flat so as not to remind the listener of another type of recording"). There is a third voice mixed in; and then a voice-over, which functions as the psychological voice. The multiform quality of the sound recording affects the content and is used as a tool to shape the style of the piece.

Through this process, Cardiff establishes various realities occurring simultaneously. As Cardiff states: "when I'm designing the narratives, they are clear. There is a delicate balance between not giving too much away and giving enough information so that the piece grows on you." The weaving and inter-weaving of ambient noise with narrative is intentional, and throughout, a female character slowly emerges, one who wants to disappear from her own life.

In a conversation with Janet Cardiff, Ralph Rugoff described *The Missing Voice* (Case Study B) as "a film soundtrack layered on reality" which reminded him of "a Sophie Calle piece where she had a private detective follow her around". And so, the narrative of the woman who wants to disappear becomes entangled in the reality of walking through alleyways and resting on church steps--the viewer becomes participant to the piece without having authority or control over the outcome--in a sense, the viewer becomes part cyborg.

In a sharp and clear manner, Cardiff draws a connection between our reality and filmic reality. With the headphones on, we plug into the directions, the narrative, and the ambient sound coming from the CD. We are drawn to perceive the whole of the inner city environment that we traverse as a giant film set, and, in the end, the message is clear: we are just Hollywood cliches. As Rugoff further states, "the piece has quotation marks around it"; in other words, it has a very clear sense of cliché and of its own ability to affect us the way a movie does. There is a pleasure in being drawn in--no responsibility, no sense of control. At the same time, there is also a bit of anxiety--where does this end? As Cardiff states, "sound allows people to use their imagination more than film or video."



Through references to the history of the Jewish quarter and incisive comments about actual places passed on the tour, Cardiff succeeds in holding the listener's attention and keeping the focus on the present, letting the listener decode the city at a sound level, making the listener hyper aware of her surroundings. With its multi-layered effect, the soundscape succeeds in establishing a physical presence for itself, and the listener becomes participant in a film piece which leaves us wanting more.

**Editor's Notes:**

1. Over the past few years Lethbridge-based Canadian artist, Janet Cardiff has developed a growing international reputation. She has recently made audio works for a number of prestigious group exhibitions including Munster Sculpture Project, 1997; Sao Paolo Biennale, 1998; The Museum as Muse, Museum of Modern Art, New York, 1999; and The Carnegie International, Pittsburg, PA, 1999.

2. Janet Cardiff, *The Missing Voice (Case Study B)* is on view @ Whitechapel Library, 77 Whitechapel High Street, London, England from June 17, 1999 thru 2000.

3. The project was commissioned by Artangel Interaction & is online @ <http://www.innercity.demon.co.uk/cardiff.htm>

## Slices of Time

Iain Borden.

**Taken from *Skateboarding, Space and the City*, Berg, 2001.**

Considering a skateboarder as representation can be undertaken in two ways. Below, I deal with the way in which representations can form a lived component of skaterboarding, but firstly, and perhaps most obviously, there is the technical image as published medium. Originally, this occurred in skateboard magazines as photographs, and among the most prolific of the US skateboard photographers in the 1970s were SkateBoarder's Warren Bolster [Fig 1.] Jim Goodrich, Craig Fineman, James Cassimus, Ted Terrebbonne and freelancer Glen E. Friedman. In the 1980s and 1990s, US photographers included TransWorld Skateboarding's J. Grant Brittain [Fig 2.], Geoff Kula and Spike Jonze, and Thrasher's Morizen Föche ('Mo-Fo'), Jeff Newton, Bryce Kanights and Chris Ortiz. In the UK, 1970s photographers included Skateboard!'s Robert Vente, Jerry Young and Ian Dobbie, and Skateboard Scene's Gregg Haythorpe. In the late 1980s and early 1990s UK they included R.A.D.'s Jay Podesta (a pseudonym for Vernon Adams), Tim-Leighton-Boyce and Paul Sunman, and Skateboard!'s (second series) Steve Kane and Paul Duffy. In the 1990s they included Sidewalk Surfer's Andy Horsley, Andy Shaw and Matthew 'Wig' Worland. These photographers began with conventional still imagery. After the advent of the first skateparks, they used new high-speed motor-drive technology to capture innovative moves and, in particular, the sequential detail of high-speed skateboard moves. This concern with disclosing the movement of the human body reaches back to the 1870s photography of Eadweard Muybridge, while also intimating at the rapid innovation of new skateboard moves.

The boys were dealing with things too rapid to be observed, the kind that are so quick that they are felt rather than seen. The documentation must be done in sequential overdrive . . . 'You should have been here yesterday' has become 'You ought to be here tomorrow.'

These pictures are already outdated. What you see here is nothing compared to what is going on now. These are just slices of time, thousandths of a second from the past.

Skateboard photographers used 15-18 mm wide-angle lenses to get close to the action, emphasising locational context, at once celebrating and analysing the event. Some photographers also use wide-angles to exaggerate the height and posture of moves ('those 15mm fisheyes distort everything just about right') and, as such lenses are expensive, to make photographs noticeably 'professional.'



Fig 1. The 'forever' oscillation within a desert pipe. Gregg Weaver at the 10 o'clock position (1977). Photograph Warren Bolster)

Bolster and SkateBoarder experimented in 1978 with 'stroboscopic' images, alongside blurred images, thus 'freezing the feeling by blurring the motion.' Later photographers like Worland have also used stroboscopes. Other techniques included multi-image frames, or the combination of flash with slower shutter speeds to portray a sharp skater overlaid onto their blurred movement across surrounding terrain. Although undoubtedly successful as dramatic composites, such images also expose the partial limitation of still photography with respect to time, both eradicating the immediate time of the event, and dehistoricising the time of its location. Although readily available in the specialist magazines, such images are thus restricted by the limitations of the medium.

In response, the moving image has been exploited. The 1970s films like *Magic Rolling Board* (1977), *Skateboard* (Universal, 1978), *Freewheelin'*, (Dir. Scott Dittrich, 1976), *Super Session*, (Dir. Hal Jepsen, 1976), *Go For It* (Dir. Hal Jepsen), *Skateboard Madness*, (Dir. Hal Jepsen, 1977-82), *Hot Wheels* (James Street, Dir. Richard Gayer, 1978) and *London Skateboards* (Dir. Ian MacMillan, 1978) were supplemented in the 1970s and 1980s with sporadic television coverage on the main US and UK network channels. By mid 1980 Allen, owner of Marina del Rey skatepark, was hosting a weekly cable television programme devoted to skateboarding; *Action Now* similarly launched a television version of itself in mid 1981. Pipeline skatepark had installed a video system for instant feedback by 1980, while skaters in the 1970s often made 8 mm movies.

But the 1980s saw this kind of representation become most important, when skateboarders exploited new camcorder and video technology to capture and distribute skate moves. A large number of skate videos are now available, some as video magazines with skaters from different locations, such as the *American 411* or the *English Video-Log*, and others as elaborate manufacturer videos showcasing professional team skaters. The latter can be very sophisticated, beginning with the first Powell-Peralta videos of the mid 1980s which 'blew open' the skateboard world. For example, the *Ban This* video (Powell-Peralta, Dir. Peralta and C.R. Stecyk, 1989) manipulated tracked shots, skateboard-mounted cameras, special lighting, overlays, montage, film stock and high-design graphics. Videos like *Bones Brigade* (Powell-Peralta, 1984), *Future Primitive* (Powell-Peralta, 1986), *Wheels on Fire* (Santa Cruz, 1988), *Streets on Fire* (Santa Cruz, 1989), *Useless Toys* (New Deal, 1991), *Las Nueve Vidas de Paco* (Chocolate/Girl, Dir. Spike Jonze, 1995) and *A Mixed Media* (Panic/Blueprint, 1996) were intended to promote these manufacturers, but also satisfied skaters' demand to see professionals in action. Some were quick to produce, using television rather than film production values; the *H Street* company with Mike Ternasky pioneered the exploitation of low-cost camcorders, producing *Shackle Me Not* (1989), *Hocus Pocus* (1990) and other videos by giving camcorders to team riders to shoot their best tricks, then hacking together a quick rough-edit for release. Small companies and new skaters were thus able to record and distribute their moves within weeks, and also, given the rapid development of skate moves, to suggest they were ahead of other, larger companies.




Fig 2. Motor-drive and wide-angle photographic sequence by Grant Brittain, deployed to capture the fast intricacies of a varial invert, (1989). Skateboarder: Ken Park.

In another variation, since the early 1990s local skaters have also increasingly produced their own videos, using domestic formats for production and dubbing onto standard VCR equipment. The results are sold for minimal cost through local skate shops and mail order; UK examples include *The Hoods* (Big Films, 1997) from Margate, *Raging Hull* (Hull Skaters, 1997) from Hull, *Renaissance* (Wayne Fenlon, 1996-7) from Edinburgh, *Network Neighbourhood* (1997) from Chelmsford, and *A Product of Our Surroundings* (Martin Meegan, 1997). These low-budget, videos are filmic equivalents of 1980s and 1990s skate 'zines (see Chapter 6), showing local skaters doing moves in a variety of quotidian skate spots.

News of modern moves, the tricky tricks and the flippity kicks, spread like wildfire  
via phone, fax, Xerox and mini-cams.

These are essentially local and informal communications ('we all try to shoot each other'), giving a sense of a particular place – *Renaissance*, for example, focuses mostly on the 'Bristo Square' skate scene in Edinburgh. Other productions are more artistic in nature. For example, Shaun Gladwell's experimental video installation, *Kickflipping Flâneur*, (Artspace, Sydney, 5-28 October 2000), incorporated a tri-partite projection exploring the poetic and urban content of skateboarding with equal degrees of emphasis.

The videos are then perhaps the most accurate way of reproducing the sound and movement of skateboarding, portraying skateboarding at its most prosaic, ordinary in its accessibility and location, extraordinary in its appearance and context.

Furthermore, skaters are increasingly using the internet to receive and post images and movie clips; in 1997 the alt.skateboard site was far more active than in the past few years. From fledging ventures like Thrasher's bulletin board and R.A.D.'s e-mail address in the mid-1980s, skate cyberspace expanded by 1997 to over 130 sites ranging from commercial manufacturers and shops to professional 'digital magazines' like *Influx*, *Heckler* and the UK-focused 'digital skate resource' *Project* (begun 1996), to good college sites, like the *DansWORLD* site, to skaters' own sites like the Dutch *Hupthur* and female-skater *b-grrrl* from Melbourne, or *Skate Geezer*, catering for veteran skaters of the 1970s-80s, to the Usenet alt.skateboard site, with incessant conversation on a myriad of topics from how to perform tricks, equipment, phrases, ramp design, drugs, the existence of god, general abuse, to (most popular of all) skate shoe design. Country-specific sites also yield information about places from Finland to Canada. From these sites skaters represent skate moves through textual descriptions, choreographic codes using the ASCII character set, still photographs and movie clips – all viewable on the screen or down-loaded. The overall effect is to make it easier for skaters to disseminate material globally, certainly compared to commercial magazines or videos.

## Heri Dono

### Glass Vehicles

Heri Dono is a multi-media artist whose works incorporate video, music, and found materials. He was born in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1960 and currently lives in Yogyakarta. Some of the exhibitions he has participated in include: Exploring the Future of the Imagination, the Inter Communication Centre Tokyo, Japan 1997; Universalis, 23rd Biennial International Sao Paulo, Brazil 1996; Traditions/Tensions - Contemporary Art in Asia, the Asia Society, New York 1996; Jurassic Technologies, 10th Biennial of Sydney 1996; Beyond the Border, 1st Kwangju Biennale, Korea; Inner City, 1997; Inner City, 1999 and Cities on the Move at the Hayward Gallery, London, 1999. In 2000 he received the UNESCO prize for the Promotion of the Arts at the Shanghai Biennale.

Dono is constantly seeking new media to realise his ideas. Laughter and humour are very important to him as they serve to illustrate his discontent with the world around him. Glass Vehicles comprises fifteen fibreglass dolls in krupuk (prawn cracker) - barrels, made of glass and metal. Dono suggests that the dolls symbolise the people whose wings are clipped by State regulation.



# Bodies Incorporated: Theoretical Appropriation for Somatic Intervention

Victoria Vesna and Robert Nideffer

<http://vv.arts.ucla.edu/index.html>



[PRELUDE: but with resistance to initiate; composed of three displacements, thirty-four notes, and sixteen interrupts, all intended to traverse the intentionally disarticulated discursive terrain of the "body." What follows (dys)functions as an appropriative hypertextual foray into what we call "cut and paste theory," a rhythmically (un)natural methodology for those finding themselves evermore adapted to working and living in fragmentary, dispersive, and non-linear environments. There are three main sections of dis- and re-placed text, each of which begins with an abstracted description of the t(r)opological milieu of Bodies INCorporated, a physical/Net installation. Following our initial displacements are sampled passages from other's writings, extracted, mixed-up, interrupted, repurposed and re-presented in effort to (un)systematically address conceptual issues that arise in response to our project-ed confrontation.]

## The Pre-Constructed Body

[DISPLACEMENT 1: Hypertextualized bodies in limbo -- a region where immaterialized thought-forms are detained until final judgment -- abstracted from the temporal flow, discontinuous, disarticulated, inert and constrained. Gestational body-as-prosthesis, enabling psychological acclimation to an aethereal self-as-other.]

Literary figurations of the reproductive body have always been open to a wide range of meanings, because literature functions as one of the institutions through which human beings are shaped to the needs of their society, through the process of identity construction that occurs in, and mutually implicates, both the symbolic and the material realms. The constructionist body is not equal to the task if it is merely a compensatory or reactionary opponent to the humanist body. The proletarianization or automatization of the body with respect to "discursivity" is an anxious reaction-formation to the "loss" of an autonomy that was itself an exclusive fiction. [F]ractured identities call attention to alternatives, always multiple, always in tension.



[INTERRUPT: somatically dis-placed anxiety around the loss of some fictional "self" is what happens when cognitive realities are structured through simplistic, ontologically stabilizing yet conceptually constraining, binarisms.]

[T]he nature of "consciousness" and "desire," or the familiar set of categorical oppositions that we rely upon to understand ourselves and our relationship to the universe: male/female, organic/inorganic, artifice/nature, reality/illusion, originality/duplication, life/death, human/inhuman [must be broken down] The wholesale, and often inappropriate, application of rigid and calculable norms encourage[s] the regularization of irregular, shadowy, and complex bodies in the name of an [author-itative] and corrective theory. The body is always a [dys]function of discourse.

[INTERRUPT: Un/Conscious desire for teleological progress(ion), is historically rooted in oppressively dualistic frameworks that resist ambivalent mid-sections, and work instead toward culmination points or "ends."]

## The De-Constructed Body



[DISPLACEMENT 2: Death as spectacle, spectacular death -- now graphically materialized, soon to be de-materialized, thought-forms - - where psychological attachment is activated by the prospect of (psychic and terminally) projected loss. The dis-embodied becomes emotionally charged, ready to be horrifically realized, consequentially committed, and ex(or)cised.]

We have disparate experiences of individual social identities, having at their focus a physical "unit," a fiduciary entity called the person, whose varying modes of existence both support and problematize the obduracy of individual identity and its refractoriness to deconstruction. The victim dies and the spectators share in what [the] death reveals. This is what religious historians call the sacramental element ... the revelation of continuity through the death of a discontinuous being to those who watch it as a solemn rite. A violent death disrupts the creature's discontinuity: what remains, what the tense onlookers experience in the succeeding silence, is the continuity of all existence with which the victim is now one.

[INTERRUPT: Performative fascination with unified textual sacrifice solicits trepidation over the prospect of summoning a correspondence between physically being and the illustrated death of the phantasmatic.]

The narrative continues to fragment, however, introducing drawings that intrude into the textual space without notice or comment, and scrawled lines that run down the page, marking zones where the pros/e stops and the truncated, voiceless body of the text remains. From these semiotic spaces emerges a corpse that, haunting the narrative, refuses to stay buried ... Death, for instance, may open [the void at a specific point]: the corpse into which death infuses absence ... A dead body cannot be called nothing at all, but that object, that corpse, is stamped straight off with the sign "nothing at all."

[INTERRUPT: Excremental bodies, nauseatingly decomposed, decayed, and distantiated, nevertheless retain an apparitional status, functioning as ghostly reminders of their rancorously reconfigured cybernetic traces.]

The repressed reemerges, among other things, through the mechanism of displacement: "What is repressed (but never destroyed) in the self [is] projected outward in order to be hated and disowned.

[INTERRUPT: Not necessarily conscious and out of control displays in public spaces can cause confusion, fear, anxiety, panic: "It was an accident, a mistake," "I'll sue you if you don't delete my body"; the thought of a misconstrued manifestation too painful to bear/bare.]

According to phenomenology, in the everyday world we do not normally experience our bodies, nor our pain, as objects ... it is when we try to pay attention to pain or to talk about it, to "make sense" of it, that we objectify it. Experiencing severe pain, we simply are "in pain," we are "pain-full"... Danger, the sense of threat as well as seductiveness which the computer can evoke, comes from both within and without ... It simultaneously constitutes erotic pleasure and a sense of loss of [authority] over the loss of the body. This mobilizes a constellation of responses to the simulation which deeply engage fear, pleasure, and also, perhaps, the simultaneous desire for and possibility of control.[W]e often experience the body as an alien environment in which our body appears as something over which we do not have control. The desire for rational calculated [command] of a predictable total environment in digital form surely has more to do with the death drive than with love of life.



[INTERRUPT: Wizards, avatars, and tiny sex to die for; movement within the massively mediated "hyperreal" is problematically viewed as moving out of or away from something granted more ontological privilege and epistemological status, neglecting to productively show how ...]

[B]y the mirage of "virtual reality," ... "true" reality ... is posited as a semblance of itself, as a pure symbolic edifice.

## The Re-Constructed Body

[DISPLACEMENT 3: Fetishized bodies to behold, beholden bodies to fetishize -- audibly text-ured thought-forms now crystallized, -- dispersively and cross-referentially exhibited in the public sites/sights they become, copyright disabled, voyeuristically available for parasitical/viral reproduction. An exposed community of body-owners, affectively touched in the intangible realm, made vulnerable to a defaulted void.]



[W]hat is the gaze if not \*theoria\* grasping the "thing itself" in the presence of its form or in the form of its presence; what is the voice if not the medium of the pure "auto-affectation" enabling the presence-to-itself of the speaking subject? The gaze is, so to speak, a point at which the very frame ... is already inscribed in the "content" of the picture viewed ... the same with the voice as object: this voice -- ... addressing me without being attached to any particular bearer -- functions again as a stain ...

[INTERRUPT: Text-u(r)ally embedded bodies, the "actual" and the "artificial," graphically marked and projected with disordered voices; im/material manifestations that stand equivalent within the scene surveyed, imbued with an independent existence disconnected from authorial presence]

[A] concept such as "disorganized surveillance" would indeed begin to do justice to the complexities of contemporary practices. New technologies ... make possible a new intensity of surveillance, penetrating much more deeply into [our] daily routines ... [F]etishistic scopophilia ... can exist outside linear time as erotic instinct is focused on the look alone ... The camera becomes the mechanism for producing ... an ideology of representation that revolves around the perception of the subject ... a convincing world in which the spectator's surrogate can perform with verisimilitude. The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion of substantial unity), and a volume in disintegration. As in performance art, the body becomes the site of exploration, a site in which the implications of postmodern dissolution are inscribed and hypostatized. The body is already an interface between mind and experience ... The obsessive restaging of the alteration of the body is also a constant refiguring or redefinition of the subject through biotechnological apparatuses. The computer-mediated milieu renders the body nakedly public ... Similarly, one result of the new non-invasive imaging technologies in the area of medicine is the capability of turning a person inside out ... It conjures up foreboding visions of an all-powerful observer who has instant visual access to the anatomy, biochemistry, and physiology of a patient. Computer tomography x-ray imaging (CT), positron emission tomography (PET), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and ultrasound now probe noninvasively, but publicly, formerly private regions and occluded and secluded recesses. It remains to be determined, however, just what are the social or political dimensions and the ethical implications of this generalized somatic visibilization of the invisible.

[INTERRUPT: Exteriorization of the interior self-as-site for public exploration, unpleasantly spotlighting the sacred-as-secret no longer, harshly penetrated, mercilessly exposed and incandescent, engenders an obsessive fascination with illusory subjectivities]

We misunderstand those elaborate formations made from human bodies ... set in motion and put on display, by seeing them as mere ornaments, as deindividualizations, as luxury-product nature ... or as indulgent forms of waste. They are also, clearly, technical apparatuses, machines as well as diagrams ... [Deleuze and Guattari] also explore ways in which bodies can be seen as non-unitary, heterogeneous machines that may emphasize rather than obscure the contingent and ongoing process of reproducing subjectivities. So the contemporary drama of the subject, terminal flesh, is played out on the surface of the body -- "depth" is an illusion that belongs to a passing moment of a particular subjectivity. The surface of the body becomes the arena for dissolving the governing instrumental reason of the organism. Is it even possible to distinguish between the socially contingent rules of subject-formation, understood as regulatory productions of the subject through exclusion and foreclosure, a set of "laws" or "structures" that constitute the invariant mechanisms of foreclosure through which \*any\* subject comes into being?

[INTERRUPT: Regulatory and regulated bodies in motion, speaking though spoken through, self-(dis)organizing into an in/organic machinic phylum; a new kind of species-becoming that is and has always been both empirically and experientially suspect.]

The "original" body is the authenticating source for the refigured person in cyberspace: no "persons" exist whose presence is not warranted by a physical body back in "normal" space. There is a sense, then, in which we are all inhabited by processes of nonorganic life. We carry in our bodies a multiplicity of self-organizing processes of a definite physical and mathematical nature -- a set of bifurcations and attractors that could be determined empirically, at least in principle. Yet, is there any way \*to experience\* this nonorganic life traversing us ...


[INTERRUPT: What is thought through language but an attempt to render the intangible tangible, to re-productively expose the immateriality of the material, to pay homage to the emotional logic of the more than double(d)-agent.]

[There exists] a pervasive tendency to ignore or misrecognize the social nature of the body, and the multifold ways it is constituted by relations with other bodies, in favor of a reified conception of the body as bounded individual, [just as there is] a propensity to ignore the primary character of the body as material activity in favor of an emphasis on the body as a conceptual object of discourse; [but] the severance of the body's social roots, its de-materialization is a ... [problematic] substitution of "the body" conceived as a set of individual psychological or sensuous responses and needs for the body as material process of social interaction.[30] The social relations implicated in emotional experience [directly] involve the body: not simply the body as a physical entity subject to external forces, but the body as agent ... Those accounts [of the body] which focus on cultural presuppositions, vocabularies of emotion, and other cultural constructions suppose that social relationships are less important to emotional experience than the culturally given cognitive structures in terms of which social relations are supposedly given their meaning. In this approach the bodily basis of emotion are generally ignored or even denied.

[INTERRUPT: The internally externalized emotionality of the more than body-double(d) is perceptually pre-fabricated, encoded and decoded, through techno-culturally constructed prosthetic device.]

Technology ... shapes our perceptions and cognitive processes, mediates our relationships with objects of the material and physical world, and our relationship with our own or other bodies. And as if that weren't enough, we've also instituted \*traditions\* and \*norms of critical reflection\*, the better to police our identities, and to prevent our minds and our bodies from going astray.[But] no matter how virtual the subject may become, there is always a[nother] body attached. It may be off somewhere else -- and that "somewhere else" may be a privileged point of view -- but consciousness remains firmly rooted in the [mediascapes of the] physical.

[REFRAIN: Unceasingly, and with reluctance to terminate; "reach out and touch someone"© -- <http://www.arts.ucsb.edu/bodiesinc>]



# Human regions

H.J Fleure

Taken from Human Geography, edited by Agnew, Livingstone and Rogers, Blackwell, 1996.

Class	Physical Characters	Human Activities	Examples
I. REGIONS OF HUNGER	Extreme cold or isolated deserts	Hunting and collection of plant products	Arctic Regions, Deserts of Australia and S. Africa,
II. REGIONS OF DEBILITATION	Equatorial rains, Tierra Caliente, overheated islands.	Collection of plant products, hunting, sometimes a little gardening and fishing.	Amazon lands, Congo Tierra Caliente generally, parts of Guinea, Madagascar Lowlands, E. Coast of Africa, parts of monsoon lands, several Pacific islands.
III. REGIONS OF INCREMENT.	Climate with sufficiency and regular alternation of sun and rain.	Fruit cultivation, gardening, rice-growing, commerce, cities, aesthetics, engineering work, such as roads, bridges, etc.	Parts of Mediterranean Coast, Colchis, Kuban, California, S.E. United States, part of Chili and Brazil, parts of E. Coast of Australia, parts of New Zealand, of India, and of the E. Indies, of Indo-China, of China and Japan. Some highlands in Mexico, Brazil, Uganda, Abyssinia, Madagascar. Some oases are intermediate between this and the next group.
IV. REGIONS OF EFFORT.	Usually temperate climate, without too great changes. Moisture at most seasons.	Corn-growing, states organised for defence, privileges of property. Much energy for exploitation of resources.	France, British Isles, Germany, S. Scandinavia, central parts of Russian plain where not too wet, parts of the Balkans, Transvaal, Rhodesia, Manchuria, parts of Siberia, of the Sudan, most of the U.S.A., parts of the east of Central Australia, most of New Zealand.
V. INDUSTRIALISED REGIONS.	Up to the present, temperate climate, and some natural source of industrial power. Facilities for communication.	Manufacturing, usually with intense specialisation, Agriculture threatened, but sometimes maintained by special effort (Germany). Invention and organisation. Finance.	Portions of England and of Central Lowlands of Scotland, Belfast district, N. France, and Belgium, parts of Germany, especially near the Tall-Line', Bohemian districts, parts of Poland and Russia. Scandinavian and Alpine regions thanks to hydro-electric power. Japan, and parts of the U.S.A. and Canada. Possibilities in India, China, New Zealand, etc.
VI. REGIONS OF LASTING DIFFICULTY.	High valleys of temperate regions. Plateaux with cold winters.	Small farming, stock raising, herding with transhumance, exportation of men, especially for manual labour and the Mercantile Marine.	Alpine valleys, Pyrenees, Tatra, parts of Balkan Peninsula, Caucasus, Armenia, Spanish Meseta, Plateau Central, several parts of Wales, Scotland, and Scandinavia, Afghanistan, parts of Sudan, etc.
VII. REGIONS WANDERING.	Great variations of temperature, seasonal drought.	Herding and, in parts, hunting.	Large areas in W. and Central Asia, in Africa, in Patagonia, in U.S.A. east of the Rockies. In each case the application of the resources of civilisation acquired especially in IV. is now being foreshadowed.

## Peak Practices

The production and regulation...of ecstatic bodies.

Maria Pini

**Taken from *The Virtual Embodied* Edited by John Wood, Routledge, 1998.**

Raving is about the time you spend doing things that are about freedom ... It's the time when you can really be yourself. (Jane)

[Raving] just gives you a personal freedom. It's like self-expression, isn't it?... It's like a total expression. (Teresa)

It's when you let it all go and just become yourself. You let go of all your inhibitions and feel much freer to be yourself. (Kate)

You feel really free ... It felt like you were yourself. (Miriam)

As has historically been the case in interpreting youth cultural practices, a familiar association between the practices of raving and notions of freedom has emerged, and the British rave scene has, since the late 1980s, generated its own particular version of what this freedom entails. The main aim of this chapter is to challenge certain (arguably) oversimplistic readings of rave culture by indicating some of the complexities and contradictions involved in the experiences of raving. In particular, I want to contrast claims for 'freedom' made on behalf of rave with the strenuous efforts which can be seen to go into its production. I therefore emphasise how much self-regulation and management is required to produce what many ravers and academics valorise as a form of unregulated being.

Lisa Blackman in Chapter 10 highlights the tendency to polarise the new technologies into liberatory or repressive modes; invested either with some radical transformative potential or feared as an extension of repressive state control and surveillance. There are many parallels between current techno-criticism and the discursive interplay that surrounds contemporary rave culture. First, there is the association between raving and freedom. Just as virtual space is often ascribed celebratory readings, so the rave space is commonly seen to transform the socialised self into a 'freer', less regulated state of being; one that reveals a basic human core within its socialised exterior. Somehow, the use of drugs, the effects of music, the practice of communal social dance, and the collective nature of rave events are seen to dissolve this exterior leaving participants in a more 'natural' state. Some academic readings of rave events thus make claim to a pre-Oedipal nature of being, whilst others invoke the primitivist language of shamanism and tribalism.

The second parallel between rave and techno-critical debate is the established dualism which casts rave culture as signalling either a form of progressive, postmodern youth politics or a form of escapism on the part of youth attempting to 'avoid' the realities of wider economic and social hardship. Hesmondhaigh correctly notes that the discussion of rave tends to divide into categories of either celebration or lamentation. Where some commentators see it constituting a form of 'unregulated' space reminiscent of Hakim Bey's Temporary Autonomous Zone' (TAZ), others, such as Richard Sutcliffe, emphasise autonomy, suggesting that 'rave is about free corporeal expression in relation to music'. Sutcliffe attributes individual experiences of autonomy to the collective autonomy of rave organisation which he likens to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of a war machine, i.e. rhizomatic in form and resistant to fixture. Here, the evasion of police surveillance and control, and the erratic way that fliers are disseminated can be seen as a sign of rave's rhizomatic form. Some researchers read rave in terms of Deleuze and Guattari's figuration of a Body without Organs (BWO), arguing that rave dance-floor movement can best be captured through the concept of Lines of Flight. However, the above arguments are difficult to support. For example, Bey has recently claimed that the freedom from state interference described within the TAZ is no longer possible, and this may also be true for other forms of public meeting. Sutcliffe makes an automatic connection between practices that may fall outside of state bureaucratic control and a 'free' form of subjectivity. Equally dubious is the (academic) theory that rave is a culture of 'disappearance' that somehow resists meaning, and therefore cannot be classified and appropriated by the academy.

Where rave culture is likened to a TAZ or to a BWO, with the implication that it is somehow less rule-bound and hierarchically structured than other forms of collective organisation, ravers are commonly read as embodiments of 'freedom'. Their subjective 'freedom' is assumed to stem from the absence of classificatory devices and 'masterful' gazes which apparently

characterise other, more 'rational' forms of subjectivity. For example, Rietveld argues that the raver experiences 'an undoing of the constructed self' and Jordan writes that: 'In these vast celebrations usually called raves, participants gradually lose subjective belief in their self and merge into a collective body whose nature is best captured by Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the Body without Organs' Whilst I do not deny the genuine sense of freedom which can be involved in raving, nor the 'loss' of rationality which can emerge from the particular technology/body/chemical assemblage which constitutes an event, I also believe that a more cogent interrogation of the precise nature of this perceived freedom is overdue. Conversely, whilst many of the more celebratory readings of rave imply some kind of essential, unregulated and basic human state, others imply that ravers are 'duped', 'mistaken' or 'confused'. A common argument about contemporary social dancing is that it empowers girls and women. Sarah Thornton, by contrast, dismisses experiences of freedom felt by female ravers by referring to the 'reality' of their subordinate social situation. She also criticises certain studies which, she claims: 'conflate the feeling of freedom fostered by the discotheque environment with substantive political rights and freedoms'. Admittedly, her concern is not with the study of experience, but with the accumulation, within club culture, of an influential mindset which she calls 'subcultural capital'.

I believe it to be inadequate to dismiss experiences of 'freedom' simply because it is possible to counter these by pointing to a more visible 'reality'. Donna Haraway states that 'experience is a semiosis, an embodying of meaning' and in this sense, experience is no less a cultural signifier than are the more concrete signs of 'rights and freedoms'. Experience is therefore just as worthy of serious treatment as are the more formal traces of culture. What is needed, however, is for references to 'freedom' and 'liberation' to be explored more closely. To argue that an experiential moment of 'freedom' might be produced whilst being monitored and otherwise constructed is not to argue that it is not real. It is merely to reiterate the arguments of social constructionism. Seeing experiences of 'freedom' as simply the product of rave's supposed lack of regulation is insufficient. It seems to rest upon an essentialism which posits a pre-socialised human core which is somehow uncovered through the practices of raving.

In short, just because raving can provide a freedom from certain wider day-to-day regulatory practices (including perhaps, the self-practices involved in maintaining the more coherent and rational subjectivity required for say, working, going to school, or conducting a conversation), this does not mean that it constitutes an essentially unregulated space. There is, I am arguing, no such thing as an entirely unregulated space or an essentially unregulated subject, and even the experience of freedom may involve its own regulatory and self-governmental mechanisms. This view is not shared by the 'postmodernist' perspective taken in *Rave Off*, whose authors seem to see rave culture as belonging in an almost post-apocalyptic 'beyond', in which both 'meaning' and the constructed 'self' are dead. One of the problems with this interpretation is that little or no consideration is given to the various operations which work towards the production of what may come to be experienced as a state of meaninglessness, freedom or 'undone' selfhood and the work which goes into maintaining such a state. Instead, the impression given by many of these writers is that the raver enters this state of 'freedom' simply and automatically, as a result of being within the rave environment. Attending to these operations would necessarily involve acknowledging the extent to which selves are 'done' as much as 'undone' within the context of the rave event. Further, the lack of specificity which commonly characterises this work makes for a denial of the numerous differences that exist between different individuals' and groups' experiences of raving, and indeed, their different notions of what constitutes 'freedom' or 'autonomy'. In much of this commentary therefore, one is far more likely to encounter the raver as a non-specified general; as a 'techno-shaman' or a 'cyber-hippie' rather than as a raced, sexed and otherwise inscribed and embodied subject.

The tendency to present ravers as non-specific abstracts is centrally related to the 'semiotic totalitarianism' which marks a lot of work on rave; work that makes strong claims to the "truth" about rave. Concentrating too hard on specific negotiations of the possibilities opened up by rave would clearly disturb such a tendency. This however, is precisely what is needed in order that the 'freedom' which an individual raver might experience does not become 'Freedom' as an abstract concept.

### **The constitution of a 'peak' moment**

Writing almost a decade ago, Simon Reynolds made the following observation:

Our culture has long since ceased to demand deferment of gratification or sublimation of energy: it insists on enjoyment, incites us to develop our capacity for pleasure. 'Youth' -because coterminous with sex, style, hedonism, fitness - has become the supreme value in our society, almost a definition of health ... Pop has always been body-music, but the body is now the prime locus of power's operation, where power solicits us. Being

a success in life involves a maximisation of your body's potential for health and pleasure.

If Reynolds sees, within popular cultural practices of the mid-1980s, a growing incitement to the heightening of bodily pleasures, then rave can be seen to have taken this to an extreme in the 1990s. Although it is important to recognise the growing fragmentation of "rave culture", what unites the various modifications of this culture is the (often relentless) pursuit of the 'peak' or 'limit' experience. As I have argued elsewhere, within rave it is the individual mind/body/soul which becomes the primary target to be worked on in pursuit of this limit.

The analysis that follows seeks to trouble any oversimplistic attribution of 'freeing' potential to the practices of raving whilst simultaneously acknowledging the reality of this potential and the pleasurable sensations that its pursuit and achievement can effect. Drawing from interview material I simply want to illustrate how, in several specific situations, the ecstatic peak comes to be achieved. One thing that emerges from this unfortunately brief discussion is the need to look to the specificity of subject's situated realisations of these peaks. The following examples -which illustrate some of the various self-operations involved in achieving and maintaining a desired raving state - are intended to raise questions about claims such as Sutcliffe's that "autonomy is inherent to raving" and 'rave is about free corporeal expression in relation to music'. They also highlight some of the contradictions that are part of the ravers' own discourses.

Foucault writes that:

Technologies of the self... permit individuals to effect by their own means with the help of others a number of operations on their bodies and souls, thought, conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality.

• • •

Sally and Jean are two 19-year-old, unemployed single mothers. The following excerpts are taken from a group interview conducted in 1996. When asked initially what they got out of raving, they agreed that it was the freedom which it afforded them - what Jean calls 'complete self-expression'. Within the wider contexts of their lives, where the demands of single motherhood and financial constraints limit how and where they can "express" themselves, it is easy to see how the rave environment comes to signal this moment of "freedom". Paradoxically however, their moment of 'freedom' and 'self-expression' - which both agree constitutes their 'happiest' times (in both cases, as important to them as becoming mothers) can cost them the equivalent of four weeks' house-keeping money, which means that they have to make major sacrifices during their non-raving time. Similarly, both repeatedly return to detailing the growing intensities of their 'come-downs' from drugs: Jean describes these as 'pure hell' and points out that she 'just knows' that she's always going to have a bad come-down, and 'just knows' that it's going to be 'hell'.

What is immediately apparent from these accounts is the rigorous management of time, energy, money and pain which goes into the production of their moment of 'freedom'. The following extracts indicate how the 'wrong' music; the 'wrong' drugs; the 'wrong' look or word from a fellow raver; attacks of cramp, drug-use, all pose threats to the achievement of the desired state. As a result of the constant potential threats posed to 'peak', aspects such as paranoia and interpersonal relationships are all worked out in terms of a specific set of 'management' strategies devised to deal with them. This clearly brings into question any suggestion that the 'peak' or ecstatic state is a necessary or straightforward effect of anyone aspect of raving - such as drugs. What Sally and Jean's accounts make clear is the amount of sheer hard work which goes into making rave function in the correct way for them. On many occasions the women stress having to 'push it' in order to achieve desired drug effects - again, something which challenges simplistic 'pharmaceutically determinist' arguments:

I find that on a lot of Es though, to begin with you have got to push it. And then like, I'd done the three Es and was feeling nothing and I thought, fucking hell, I've just borrowed all this money to come up to London and I'm sitting down and I've got to push this. So I was like 'push it. Push it.' (Jean)

'Rushing' on particular drugs; 'peaking' with particular people; staying 'on one' in particular crowds clearly involve much effort. The fragility of this state becomes clear as Jean and Sally gradually describe more and more potentially disturbing forces. For example, Julie speaks of a 'bad' night where her high-heeled boots stopped her dancing, and made her feel that

people were looking at her, which in turn made her feel self-conscious for the whole night. For Jean, a particular threat to her enjoyment is embodied by her boyfriend Peter. Jean's 'peak' experiences are therefore very much structured, a round what he does, and doesn't, 'allow' her to do:

I mean, say if I am talking to a geezer, I've always got that constant fear of Peter wandering by and seeing me. Cause he's so jealous. I have to be careful. So what I tend to do is dance until I come down. I've always got people coming up to me saying 'Pete's looking for you'. I'm 'yeah, yeah. Alright. I mean, don't tell him you've seen me' kind of thing. Then, when I come down, I go and find him. I didn't go out for a long time. That was only because my boyfriend didn't let me.

Where women such as Sally and Jean have devised certain techniques for recognising, handling and coping with the paranoia, Andy's account exemplifies how men have to deal with the perceived need to 'cope' with the pressures/within rave. In this case, Andy's ability to .control and manage is articulated in 'fighting' terms,; as an internal battle;^ test of personal strength. Andy says of his E-use:

I suppose it's whether you can control it... some people can't take it. Some people's personality can't cope - they can't control the rush. I've been close to it but I've stopped it. It's the paranoia at the back of your head. It always gets to you. Sometimes you do a pill and think 'fucking hell, I wonder if I'll be alright on this one?' You can be scared, but at the end of the day, you just got to put it aside and say 'bollocks' to it.

The theme of paranoia is also something which, in Jean and Sally's accounts, is clearly tied up with more general preoccupations with seeing and being seen. Jean, for example, says that nothing is quite as good for her as realising that she is being watched by a 'horny' man. She dances where the 'horny' men are and claims that being looked at by an 'ugly' man simply does not give her the same intense pleasures. Sally agrees. Realising that she is being looked at by the 'right' kind of man intensifies Jean's peak: 'It's like whoosh, you're up there'. And she says that 'horny men make you rush'. It is not surprising that one of the things that cause both women most discomfort is the thought of being seen in the 'wrong' light. Discussing the possibilities for 'pick up' in a club, Jean says: 'Imagine if it's still dark and then you left. You know, you're alright in the dark. You don't look too bad. It's when, after a few hours ... all your oils start coming out.' She reiterates this later: 'I was fine at that point - until people started looking at me ... Did my head in. I hate that feeling.' Sally makes a similar point: 'I'd never let the kids see me like that. It's not fair.' The pure 'self expression which both women claim they get from raving is clearly brought into question by the emphasis placed on remaining in a certain light. As Sally puts it, 'you're not yourself in a rave are you?'

I have suggested some of the ways in which the self is worked, managed and otherwise produced within a rave context. This troubles any easy reading of such selves as 'free'. Jean and Sally make clear the extent to which coming to recognise and 'know' the different potential disturbances to their 'peaking', and the best ways to combat such disturbance, is an integral part of raving. Self-knowledge can be seen to be constituted here, in terms of a clear classificatory system wherein experience comes to be known in terms of 'coming up', 'peaking', 'handling it', 'losing it' and so forth. What is also made clear is that such knowledge does not simply 'reveal' itself upon entry to an event. It is gradually negotiated. For example, the 'knowledge' of certain drug effects develops, which arguably constructs as much as it can be said to 'describe' such effects. This is indicated on several occasions when the women express a sense of uncertainty over precisely what they are feeling. This uncertainty is then dissipated once they come to 'know' what they are supposed to expect and experience. Hence, drug effects - which are commonly viewed as unmediated physiological responses to particular chemicals - are clearly experienced in accordance with their discursive construction. In the following extract, Sally is describing not knowing what is going on after she has taken an 'E'. This frightens her and clearly stands in the way of what she wants - enjoyment. Reaching her 'peak', rather than being about embracing such ambiguity and lack of certainty, is only achieved after recalling what Jean had told her to expect:

And I started feeling a bit sick and it was like 'phew, get to grips'. But I just kept telling myself what Jean had told me beforehand when we've talked about stuff. When she told me the first time she really came-up on an E, how it shocked her. So I kept telling myself this. In the end, I came out of it and I just enjoyed it. I just went with it. But it was scary.

Although it is clearly important to recognise the links between paranoia and the physiological effects of drugs like Speed, it is equally clear that such effects are as much the product of a wider discursive and material assemblage as are experiences and understandings of dance, interpersonal relations and so on. One thing that is clear is the extent to which Sally and Jean have to develop a particular 'knowledge' of what to expect in order to 'peak'. In the following extract, Jean is feeling 'bad' until she comes to know that this is in fact 'good':

And I thought I was losing it. Yeah, that's why. I hadn't been raving for two years and I went for my birthday to "World Dance". I was only in there about an hour and a half 'cause I walked in, first of all and the beat was different... It was faster and instead of walking into the rave and thinking, 'cor, yeah', I thought 'shit'. I started coming upon the 'E' and it was a totally different feeling to Speed, see. So I wasn't expecting all that... I didn't like it, you know. And I went outside and I was ... right off my head and I thought I was losing it. But now, I know that it was just a good E you know. I mean, it frightened me. I didn't know the feeling and it frightened me.

Drug effects are therefore subject to particular ways of knowing. Here, Jean describes a specific instance of how drug effects are experienced in terms of being able to know and classify these:

I did the rest before we went in like I always had done, but I should have known that these were really strong - stronger than we'd ever had, you know. And I lost it. Like, you can lose it on Speed. But like, when I first went in there, I thought you know, this Speed's not working. Because I didn't have the confidence that Speed gives you. I thought, this ain't working, so what is it? That's when me and Mel had an E each. So, I did my E thinking that I hadn't come up. So I was coming up on eight Speed pills and the E and then, Mel was on a good one 'cause she'd only done four Speed pills. So I was like 'let me have your half E. Give me half of your E' kind of thing. So I had that as well. Then I realised you know, this isn't that] haven't come up. This is really strong - and I'm too off my head.

Experience is heavily classified in terms of the stages of 'coming up', 'coming down' and so forth. These women have also come to recognise what type of trip and what stage in a trip the other is experiencing. They have also come to know what particular types of music, drugs, crowds, venues and so forth 'work' for them. Consequently these women have devised what is almost a set of 'rules' about these features. These include those relating to the management and risk assessment of drug intake:

JEAN: Never do a whole E. Not at first... My first E was a whole one and it was a 'Dove'. So I'd say never do a whole E.

SALLY: No...

JEAN: I'd even do it in quarters I think.

Drugs, like experiential 'stages', types of people, music and towns, are all shown to be rigidly classified. Distinctions are made between E-ravers and Speed-ravers; black men and white men: 'horny' men and 'ugly' men; 'happy' ravers and "smack-ravers"; Dover (as a Speed town) and London (as an E town).

A further aspect of these women's self-management in relation to drug use becomes clear in their descriptions of how their time (their weekends) is organised so as to allow an appropriate period during which to 'come-down'. The management of 'come-down' is most clearly manifest in their negotiations of the cross-overs between raving and motherhood. Both organise childcare in advance and stress the importance of not having their children around during 'come-down':

JEAN: Absolutely. I wouldn't be on drugs around them 'cause, nah. For a start I couldn't have (son) back on, like, a come-down. I wouldn't have him back because ... 'mum can I have this. Can I have that' and I would lose my patience. I couldn't do it.

SALLY: Yeah, it's not fair on them.

JEAN: No, 'cause they're at that early age now... I wouldn't like them to see me like that.

All of these points indicate the extent to which, rather than being about a necessarily 'freer' or less regulated time and space, raving for Jean and Sally is - at least partly - about regulation and management. To reiterate, pointing this out is not about denying the clear pleasures they get from raving. Indeed, the amount these women sacrifice, in terms of both time and money, evidences how very important raving is to them.

That one has to know - to possess some pre-existent knowledge - in order for rave to 'work' challenges any oversimplistic claim that rave is somehow disconnected from its wider cultural context; that it is independent, autonomous and self-contained. For example, Sally and Jean's construction on 'black attitude' as a disturbing force indicates too clearly how the rave 'world' continues and reinforces the categories of the wider cultural 'world'. So too do their remarks on their fears of being labelled a 'slag' if they seem to be talking too much to a particular man.

Knowledge is therefore central to Jean and Sally's accounts. These women's fears are shown to be intricately tied up with notions of not 'knowing'; not being familiar with what's going on:

It was scary "cause it was my first time at a rave and I was with Nick who'd been to a rave before. They knew what to expect. I just couldn't handle the main room, (Jean)

Like I hadn't been raving for two years and I'd got into the club and [the music] had really picked up - really fast and I couldn't handle it. My first rave in two years I did not enjoy. (Jean)

In discussing bad 'attitude' from fellow ravers, Jean says of Sally (who began raving later than her):

So she's seeing it now whereas she had never seen it so she didn't know. She didn't look out for it 'cause she didn't know what to expect but I'd tried to say it happens.

### **Ecstatic freedom reconsidered**

In this chapter I have tried to indicate how what is commonly thought of as a moment of 'freedom' and 'self-expression' is far more complex than is usually acknowledged by academic commentators on rave. I have indicated how, for Sally and Jean, their 'free' moment is in actuality one that is carefully managed, regulated and monitored. Far from being about the 'loss' or 'undoing' of the self, this moment is clearly about the production of a particular ecstatic self. It is about a rigorous working on the self rather than a relaxation of self-consciousness. For these women, their moment of 'pure' self-expression is not about presenting some naked essence (as self-expression implies), but about projecting a very particular image of themselves. Indeed, both agree that in rave you do not see people as they 'really' are. On the one hand then, the 'ecstatic' or 'peak' state is experienced as a moment within which one simply 'lets go' and by implication, somehow returns to some more 'natural' state. On the other it is seen as a moment of not being oneself; a moment wherein one is 'hidden' by drugs, dark lighting and the general 'unreality' of an event. I have also indicated the strict classifications that mark and inform the production of particular sought-after experiential states for Sally and Jean which underlie these women's experiences. To reiterate, it is by no means my intention to dismiss or undermine the pleasures of raving: the real sense of release it can be seen to afford, the often incomparably pleasurable intensities it can produce, or the central importance it can have in one's life. Instead, I would suggest that interpretations of these experiences and pleasures be dislodged from the language of the 'natural' and the essential which so commonly frames them and reconsidered as particular and embodied manifestations of the wider technology/chemical/physical assemblage that constitutes rave.